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TRANSACTIONS: USING AN OVERT
TOOL
LEE A. PIZZIMENTI*
There is no professional duty ... which compels an advocate... to
secure success in any cause, just or unjust; and when so instructed, if
he believes it to be intended to gain an unrighteous object, he ought
to throw up the cause, and retire from all connection with it, rather
than thus be a participator in other men's sins.
George Sharswood1
Covert tools are never reliable tools.
Karl Llewellyn'
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) deals in a
straightforward manner with the unenforceability of unconscionable clauses
in contracts. Prior to its adoption, courts used "covert tools" to invalidate
unfair contracts. Several theories were used, some improperly, to justify
* Lee A. Pizzimenti is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Toledo College of
Law who served as a member of the Michigan State Bar Committee for Professional and Judicial
Ethics from 1981-1984. She would like to express her appreciation to Professors Susan R. Mar-
tyn, William Richman and Beth A. Eisler, who reviewed and commented upon earlier drafts of
this article. She would also like to thank George Carstenson and Richard Papurt for their re-
search assistance.
1. G. SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 100-01 (2d ed. 1860).
2. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939).
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denial of enforcement. The result of using such tools was unpredictable and
confusing legal regulation. U.C.C. section 2-302 reduces that uncertainty.
Adoption of U.C.C. section 2-302 cannot alone cure the problem of un-
conscionable contracts. It is unlikely that the party with inferior bargaining
power will recognize and enforce his right to avoid an unconscionable con-
tract. Conversely, the attorney hired to draft the unconscionable clause by
the party with superior bargaining power should recognize that the contract
is unenforceable. Therefore, the best and most overt way to minimize the
occurrence of unconscionable contracts is to forbid a lawyer from drafting
them. This article proposes a new disciplinary rule prohibiting the attorney
from drafting unconscionable clauses.
This prohibition is based on two notions. First, the profession has an
interest in regulating this behavior because, as in litigation, the attorney is
performing a public function when drafting contracts. The current rules of
professional conduct, which prohibit assisting with baseless lawsuits, should
be extended to prohibit the drafting of baseless contracts. Second, courts
already have begun to use "covert tools," such as the doctrine of fraud, to
regulate this behavior. This article suggests that the concerns raised regard-
ing a prohibition against drafting unconscionable clauses do not justify fail-
ure to promulgate the disciplinary rule.
II. THE PROBLEM OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
Perhaps the central tenet of contract law is that parties are free to nego-
tiate and determine the terms of their bargain.' It is well-recognized, how-
ever, that some contracting parties, by virtue of their superior bargaining
3. This tenet is sometimes expressed through the doctrine of "adequacy of consideration."
Generally, so long as a promise is "bargained for," courts will not inquire into the substantive
aspects of the deal. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981). As Professor
Corbin stated:
We have a free market, under our common law, for the reason that the courts have left it
free. They do not require that one person shall pay as much as others may be willing to
pay, or that one person shall receive for what he sells as little as others may be willing to
receive for a like article. The contracting parties make their own contracts, agree upon
their own exchanges, and fix their own values.
A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 127, at 185 (1952). Professor Farnsworth suggests that the
"bargain" theory of consideration, which shifted the inquiry away from the substance of the
agreement to whether the promise was bargained for, was consistent with the prevailing notion of
trust in free enterprise. E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 41-42 (1982); cf. Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 630-31 (1943)
(freedom of contract is the inevitable counterpart of a free enterprise system, which stresses indi-
vidualism and laissez faire; the result is that contracts are private lawmaking that judges may
interpret, but they may not create contracts for the parties).
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situation and sophistication, may force powerless parties to enter into
agreements that are grossly unfair, rendering this tenet an illusion.'
In early response to this problem, courts, in the absence of a coherent
doctrine, used various devices such as contract interpretation,' lack of con-
sideration,6 fraud,7 misrepresentation,' and duress9 to avoid the offending
contract or clause.' 0 Although their intentions may have been admirable,
courts have made both apt and inapt uses of these theories to reach desired
ends. The use of "covert devices"" resulted in a morass of unintelligible
caselaw easily manipulated by intelligent lawyers. As Karl Llewellyn
observed:
[T]he law of agreeing can be subjected to divers [sic] modes of em-
ployment, to make the whole bargain or a particular clause stick or
not stick according to the status of the party claiming under it ....
4. See, e.g., E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 293 (agreements sometimes not freely
reached by parties of equal bargaining power but assented to by weaker party with little or no
opportunity for negotiation); Holley, A Moral Evaluation of Sales Practices, 5 Bus. & PROF. ETH-
ics J. 3 (1988) (contract voluntary only where both parties understand contract, neither are com-
pelled to enter into relation, and both are able to make a rational judgment about costs and
benefits); Kessler, supra note 3 (weaker party "consents" because he is not in a position to shop
around for other terms, either because strong party has a monopoly or competitors use the same
terms); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971) (standardized contracts generally are not, under any reasonable
test, the agreement of the recipient to whom they are delivered); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscio-
nability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 933 (1969) (in practice, parties do not freely agree to
unconscionable contract terms).
5. See, e.g., Galligan v. Arovitch, 421 Pa. 301, 219 A.2d 463 (1966); Kansas City Wholesale
Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 44, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937). Farnsworth observes that
three tenets of contract interpretation were especially helpful in striking down unconscionable
contracts: Terms are generally interpreted against the drafter, separately negotiated terms prevail
over standardized terms, and handwritten or typed terms prevail over printed terms. E.A.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 298.
6. Where there is a preexisting duty, agreement to perform will not be viewed as considera-
tion. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981); Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902); Rexite Casting Co. v. Midwest Mower Corp., 267 S.W.2d
327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954). As Farnsworth observes, this notion does not make sense in light of the
supposed inability of courts to review the adequacy of consideration: If the parties bargain for
continued willingness to perform, that should be the end of the matter. E.A. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 3, at 271. The doctrine came into vogue because the notion of economic duress had not
yet evolved. Id.
7. See, e.g., Williams v. Logue, 154 Miss. 74, 122 So. 490 (1929).
8. See, e.g., Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1928); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
9. See, e.g., Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1970); Austin
Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981).
10. See generally E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 212-302; Llewellyn, supra note 2, at
702; Spanogle, supra note 4, at 934.
11. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 702-03.
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The difficulty with these techniques of ours is threefold. First, since
they all rest on the admission that the clauses in question are permis-
sible in purpose and content, they invite the draftsman to recur to
the attack. Give him time, and he will make the grade. Second, since
they do not face the issue, they fail to accumulate either experience
or authority in the needed direction: that of marking out for any
given type of transaction what the minimum decencies are which a
court will insist upon as essential to an enforceable bargain of a
given type, or as being inherent in a bargain of that type. Third,
since they purport to construe, and do not really construe, nor are
intended to, but are instead tools of intentional and creative miscon-
struction, they seriously embarrass later efforts at true construction,
later efforts to get at the true meaning of those wholly legitimate
contracts and clauses which call for their meaning to be got at in-
stead of avoided. The net effect is unnecessary confusion and unpre-
dictability, together with inadequate remedy, and evil persisting that
calls for remedy. Covert tools are never reliable tools.12
Motivated by these concerns, Llewllyn and the other drafters of the
U.C.C. promulgated an "overt tool" to confront the problem of unfair
deals. U.C.C. section 2-302 provides that a court may refuse to enforce a
contract or clause it finds to be unconscionable. 3 Section 208 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts includes an identical provision designed to
extend the prohibition to contracts that do not involve transactions in
goods. 14
12. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Spanogle, supra note 4, at 933-34 (surreptitious invali-
dations of contracts caused great difficulty in predicting court rulings; contract draftsmen en-
couraged to try again with "clearer" language which in fact "was always longer, more technical
and harder for the non-drafting party to understand."); Kessler, supra note 3, at 633 (attempts to
avoid unfairness while keeping common law contract rules intact rendered law confusing: Courts
rendered just decisions by construing clauses as ambiguous even where no ambiguity existed; soci-
ety thus paid a high price for the luxury of seeming homogenity).
13. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1988) provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so
limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id.
14. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). Article 2 of the
U.C.C. applies only to transactions in goods. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1988). However, it has been ap-
plied by analogy in other contexts. See, e.g., Coast Indus., Inc. v. Noonan, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 333,
231 A.2d 663 (1966); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 408 N.E.2d 1370 (1980);
Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978). As Farnsworth states, E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 3, at 308, there are several uniform laws adopting a prohibition on unconscionability; see,
e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108; UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICE ACT § 4
(1971); UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 1-311 (1975); UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND
TENANT ACT § 1.303 (1972).
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The unconscionability doctrine has been construed to mean that agree-
ments evidencing an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties, when coupled with contractual terms that are unreasonably unfair
to the disadvantaged party, will not be enforced. 5 The immediate benefit
of the unconscionability doctrine was that, as Llewellyn hoped, friends and
critics of the doctrine could, for the first time, discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of the doctrine in a straightforward and intellectually honest
manner.1 6 Moreover, some victims of unconscionable contract clauses were
able successfully to use U.C.C. section 2-302 or Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 208 to avoid them.17
Standing alone, however, sections 2-302 and 208 are incapable of resolv-
ing the problem of the victimization of persons entering into unconsciona-
ble contracts. The very notion of unconscionability presumes that a party,
through lack of understanding, sophistication, or bargaining power, is un-
able to recognize or protect his interest.18 As a result, it is highly unlikely
that the disadvantaged party will ever understand that relief from such a
15. See Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-3 (3d ed.1988) (most cases are consistent with
Williams analysis). For a discussion of whether unconscionability is too difficult to define, see
infra text accompanying notes 135-53.
16. They did. Compare, e.g., Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. LAW &
ECON. 293 (1975); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 485 (1967); Schwartz, A Reexamination ofNonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1053 (1977); with, e.g., Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22
U. MIAMI L. REV. 121 (1967); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757
(1969); Spanogle, supra note 4.
17. See, e.g., Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985) (§ 2-302); Williams,
350 F.2d 445 (§ 2-302); Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379 (Alaska 1986) (§ 208); Truta v. Avis
Rent a Car Systems, Inc., 193 Cal. App. 3d 802, 238 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1982) (§ 2-302); Davis v.
MLG Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986) (§ 208); Williams v. Williams, 306 Md. 332, 508 A.2d 985
(1986) (§ 208); Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Assoc., 83 N.J. 86, 415 A.2d 1156 (1980) (§ 2-302);
Heen & Flint Assoc. v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 93 Misc. 2d 1, 400 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1977) (§ 208); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 289 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969) (§ 2-302);
Snyder v. Rodgers, 346 Pa. Super. 505, 499 A.2d 1369 (1985) (§ 208).
18. See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 449 (parties with obvious lack of education have little or
no knowledge of terms); Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971) (need for applica-
tion of standard most acute when the professional seller is seeking the trade of those most subject
to exploitation - the uneducated, inexperienced and people with low incomes); Frostifresh Corp.
v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281
N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967) (negotiations with Spanish speaking buyer in Spanish; contract in English
not explained). Cf Braucher, An Informal Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 1405, 1449-53 (citing empirical studies indicating that persons with lower
income and education are less likely to perceive quality problems and less likely to complain,
given fatalistic attitudes regarding their plight and lack of knowledge regarding how to complain).
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contract is possible.1 9 For example, a study of one hundred tenants with
leases in Ann Arbor, Michigan disclosed that only one-half of the tenants
(who were generally well educated) understood the meaning of simple lease
terms, while only one-third indicated they understood a sample clause ex-
culpating the landlord from paying damages and requiring the tenant to
20make repairs.
Even assuming parties understand what they sign, they may conclude
from reviewing the document that they have no rights when, in fact, they
do. For example, the tenants were asked whether clearly unenforceable
sample clauses were "valid and enforceable in a court of law. ' '2 1 More than
fifty percent of those responding assumed they were.22 Thus, it is to the
advantage of parties seeking an unfair bargain to include unconscionable
clauses in their contracts. At a minimum, they will keep some from en-
joying the rights they are entitled to receive. 3
In sharp contrast to the ignorance of the disadvantaged party, and the
resulting inability of the judicial system to address this problem, is the
knowledge of the attorney for the party in the superior bargaining position.
The attorney who drafts the offending clause should be well aware of the
fact that the clause may be held unenforceable, if his knowledge of the law
is current.2
4
In fact, current ethics rules may provide an incentive to draft such
clauses. The rules require lawyers to provide clients with legal and practi-
19. As U.C.C. § 2-302 (1988) indicates, unconscionability is a defense to enforcement of a
contract, and it is often used in response to a lawsuit by the party with superior bargaining power.
Perhaps in recognition of the inability of parties to recognize unconscionability, courts have raised
the issue sua sponte. See, e.g., Langemeier v. National Oats Co., Inc., 775 F.2d 975 (8th Cir.
1985); Capital Assoc., Inc. v. Hudgens, 455 So. 2d 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Maxon Corp. v.
Tyler Pipe Indus., 497 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. App. Ct. 1986); Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cos-
metics, Inc., 125 Misc. 2d 68, 478 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1984) (trial court must hold required hearing,
but can declare contract unconscionable on own initiative.).
20. Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L. REV.
247, 261-62, 276 (1970). For an excellent discussion of why tenants are unwilling or unable to
determine or enforce their rights, see Note, Preventing the Use of Unenforceable Provisions in
Residential Leases, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 522, 525-27 (1979).
21. Mueller, supra note 20, at 272.
22. Id.
23. Professor Goldberg observes that relief in the judicial area is not alone effective because
the expense and risk of litigation deters consumers from seeking legal counsel when confronted
with the fact that they had "agreed" to provisions. Realizing this, he concludes, firms have little
incentive to remove unconscionable terms from agreements. Goldberg, Institutional Change and
the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J. LAW & ECON 461, 488 (1974).
24. There are commentators who suggest that unconscionability is too elusive a concept to be




cal information necessary to enable them to make informed decisions.25
The rules also require lawyers to defer to the client's judgment absent fraud
or illegality.26 Moreover, lawyers have been found guilty of malpractice for
failure to disclose various options to clients.27 As a result, lawyers may feel
compelled as a matter of competent representation to advise the client that,
while a court would not enforce a clause, the vast majority of people would
believe the clauses were valid and would act accordingly. Clients, of course,
would have a strong incentive to include the clause if presented with that
opinion. Thus, it is the attorney for the person with superior bargaining
power who can best avoid the imposition of unfair requirements upon pow-
erless parties. This can be done simply by refraining from advising clients
about or drafting such a clause.
In order to achieve this goal,, however, the attorney must have some
incentive to refrain from drafting unconscionable contracts or contract
clauses. One possibility would be to allow maintenance of a malpractice
suit by the disadvantaged party against the attorney. It is highly unlikely,
however, that such a theory would be successful. Opposing parties have
attempted without success to sue opposing counsel for malpractice for
bringing frivolous lawsuits.28 In rejecting such claims, courts have rea-
soned that the opposing party was not the attorney's client and, in fact, had
interests adverse to those of the client.29 Absent an exceptional case where
25. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1983) requires that a lawyer must
"explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed deci-
sions regarding the representation." See generally Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of
Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: In-
formed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979).
26. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8, 7-9 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983). MODEL RULE 1.2(e) requires the lawyer
to consult with the client concerning limitations on professional conduct where the client expects
assistance through means prohibited by the rules, and MODEL RULE 1.2(b) provides that repre-
senting a client does not constitute an endorsement of his economic, social or moral views. Those
rules, coupled with the requirements of zealous advocacy, supply strong incentive to offer the
clause to a client. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-101 (1980); see Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking
Authority Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REv. 1049, 1064-
66 (1984). Professor Maute concludes that clients outside of the litigation context have the great-
est ability to control the lawyer given the duty to communicate and the fact that in nonlitigation
contexts client ends, which are always decided finally by the client, are more inextricably tied to
the means employed, which otherwise may be decided by the lawyer. Id. at 1085.
27. See, e.g., Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 510 A.2d 436 (1986) (malpractice to refrain from
informing client of options regarding covenants not to compete).
28. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill.
App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981).
See generally R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 376 n.1 (3d ed. 1989).
29. See, e.g., Bickel, 447 F. Supp. 1376; Friedman, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673.
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the attorney is viewed as representing both parties, 30 the same logic would
apply when parties are presumably bargaining at arm's length.3 An incen-
tive more consistent with recent developments in the law of professional
ethics would be to promulgate a rule of professional conduct prohibiting
attorneys from drafting unconscionable contracts.3 2 The body responsible
for overseeing the conduct of attorneys would enforce the rule.33
III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR PROHIBITION
A. Philosophical and Institutional Concerns
An early draft of Rule 1.2 of the American Bar Association (ABA)
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) stated that "a lawyer
shall not assist in preparation of a written instrument, which terms he
knows or reasonably should know are legally prohibited. ' 34 This proposal
was not the first attempt to prohibit lawyers from assisting in the gain of an
unconscionable advantage in counseling and negotiation contexts. In 1959,
the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility of the American Bar
Association and Association of American Law Schools (Joint Conference)
submitted a final report, approved by the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) and the ABA House of Delegates, 35 that exhorted the law-
yer that he had "no license to participate as a legal adviser in a line of
conduct that is immoral, unfair or of doubtful legality."36 Yet, the final
30. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nationwide Mortgage Corp., 659 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1987); Stinson
v. Brand, 738 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. 1987) (alternate ground for decision); cf. In re Friedman, 64
A.D.2d 70, 407 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1978) (contract between broker and artist's widow set aside as
unconscionable where attorney for broker "explained" contract he drafted and widow gave him
two pictures).
31. See, e.g., Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (lawyer for
seller owes no duty to buyer); Bell v. Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (attorney for
contractor owes no duty to customers). MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b)
(1983) and MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (1982) prohibit the
representation of parties with conflicting interests. Although it is possible to represent both sides
in non-litigation contexts, see MODEL CODE EC 5-15 and MODEL RULE 2.2, the lawyer may not
do so unless it is reasonable to assume his professional judgment will not be impaired and he can
adequately protect the interests of the parties.
32. See infra text accompanying note 134. Such a rule would be consistent with MODEL
RULE 3.1, which prohibits an attorney from bringing or defending a suit unless there is a basis
which is not frivolous, even though there is no malpractice remedy.
33. Ultimate responsibility rests with the state supreme court. ABA, AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS § 2.1 (1980).
34. ABA DRAFT MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.2 (1980).
35. Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association and the
Association of American Law Schools, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference,
44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958) [hereinafter Joint Conference].
36. Id. at 1161.
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drafts of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code)
and the Model Rules do not include a prohibition against such behavior.
Typically, the organized bar is reluctant to regulate lawyers' conduct
toward third parties on the grounds that the adversarial system works best
when adversaries clash in battle with every weapon available.37 The Joint
Conference Report indicated that the adversarial process reduces the natu-
ral human tendency to rush to judgment before considering all of the pecu-
liarities and nuances of an issue, and that intelligent and vigorous advocacy
on both sides is the best guarantee that "man's capacity for impartial judg-
ment can attain its fullest realization., 38
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. It has been observed
that the fact that the adversarial system is perceived as the best means to
achieve the just resolution of suits does not "crown [the system itself] with
supreme value. It is means, not end.",3 9 In fact, several commentators have
convincingly established that the adversarial system does not inevitably
produce truth or justice.4
37. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
38. Joint Conference, supra note 35, at 1161; see also M. FREEDMAN, supra note 37, at 4.
39. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577, 589 (1975).
40. For example, Professor Rhode exposed the illusory nature of this justification of the ad-
versarial system:
The most obvious difficulty with this premise is that it is neither self-evident nor supported
by any empirical evidence. As Geoffrey Hazard, Reporter for the Model Rules Commis-
sion, candidly acknowledges, we have "no proof that the adversary system of trial yields
truth more often than other systems of trial." Neither is it intuitively obvious that truth is
more often revealed by self-interested, rather than disinterested, exploration. The virtues
of private initiative and judicial passivity come at a cost. Lawyers are concerned with the
production of belief, not of knowledge. Why assume, to paraphrase Macaulay, that the
fairest results will emerge from two advocates arguing as unfairly as possible on opposite
sides? That is not the way most countries adjudicate controversies, nor the way other
professions conduct factual inquiry. Nor is it how the bar itself seeks truth in any setting
outside the courtroom. In preparing for trial, for example, lawyers do not typically hire
competitive investigators.
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 596-97 (1985). Moreover,
the notion of battling equals must, to maintain plausibility, ignore the economic and social reality
that not all combatants have equal resources. One would therefore expect that the haves come out
ahead of the "have nots." Id. at 597; see also Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 13 (1975) ("we are, today .... certainly entitled to be quite skeptical both
of the fairness and of the capacity for self-correction of our larger institutional mechanisms, in-
cluding the legal system.").
As Professor Shaffer demonstrated, the use of an adversarial ethic to justify a lawyer's actions
is a relatively recent development which arose because of three events: Representation of indus-
trial "robber barons" in the 1870's; the growth of national bar associations; and the appearance of
the first codes of ethics. Lawyers responded to an outcry regarding manipulation of the legal
system by lawyers who engaged in a "public" business by invoking the notion of individual rights.
Shaffer, The Unique, Novel and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988). It is
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Moreover, competing interests exist. As the Preamble to the Model
Rules states, "A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice."41 Perhaps in recognition of this, no commentator has suggested
that there can be no limit to zealous advocacy.42 In fact, both the Model
Code and the Model Rules have prohibited behavior that an unbridled zeal-
ous advocate might find consistent with the "battle" ethic. For example,
lawyers may not make false statements of law or fact,43 assist a client in
illegal or fraudulent acts, 44 or attempt to influence a judge45 or juror.46
Therefore, any attempt to justify allowing a lawyer to assist in gaining an
unconscionable advantage must be justified on its own terms, rather than by
a reference to an all-encompassing adversarial ethic, which has never and
does not currently exist.47
Finally, a justification based on an adversarial ethic, which may be legit-
imate in a litigation context, loses some force in negotiating and counseling
contexts. The Joint Conference Committee agreed that "partisan advocacy
plays a vital and essential role in one of the most fundamental procedures of
interesting to note that these changes occurred at approximately the same time as, and were influ-
enced by the same philosophy (that of laissez faire individualism) as the notion that courts would
not review the adequacy of consideration. See supra note 3.
41. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, preamble, at 9; see also Luban, The Lysis-
tratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637 (autonomy of
client is one moral good among many).
42. Monroe Freedman, for example, proposes the rule that an attorney must disclose his
client's intention to commit a crime which results in death or serious bodily harm. Freedman,
Lawyer-Client Confidences Under the ABA Model Rules: Ethical Rules Without Ethical Reason, 3
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 7 (1984). Fried believes that an attorney acts immorally where using a
method not anticipated by the system. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). Pepper agrees that the lawyer may not aid
in illegal conduct, and adds the lawyer may practice conscientious objection to serving the client
in extraordinary cases of immoral, though not illegal conduct. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral
Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
43. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.3(a)(1), 4.1(a) (1983); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1982).
44. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1982).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5(a) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-110(A) (1982).
46. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5(a) (1983). Nor can attorneys bribe
witnesses. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-108 (1982); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.4(b) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-109(C) (1982).
47. Professor Pepper's defense of an amoral role for attorneys is not based upon the notion of
an adversarial system. Pepper, supra note 42.
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a democratic society."48 Yet, members of the Committee acknowledged
that "all-out partisanship acceptable in courtroom advocacy is not to be
carried over lock, stock and barrel in the performance of the lawyer's role
as counselor.",49 As many commentators have recognized, 50 it is presumed
that advocates in open court will each vigorously represent his client under
the surveillance of a well-qualified and unbiased judge. 1 Professor Harry
Jones, Reporter to the 1959 Joint Conference, stated that this presumption
does not apply outside the litigation context:
[W]hen the lawyer is in his office devising a course of business con-
duct, a standard form contract, or a complex scheme of land acquisi-
tion and development, no opposing lawyeris there to represent the
equities of the many persons who may be affected by the lawyer's
plans, no judge is present to monitor the fairness of the arrange-
ments, and there are no fires of controversy to keep the counselor
honest and purge his client's specifications of overreaching self-
interest.5 2
48. Joint Conference, supra note 35, at 1161; Jones, Lawyers and Justice The Uneasy Ethics
of Partianship, 23 VILL. L. REv. 957, 967 (1978).
49. Jones, supra note 48, at 968.
50. See, e.g., Brown & Dauer, Professional Responsibility in Nonadversarial Lawyering" A
Review of the Model Rules, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 519; Rhode, supra note 40; Rubin, supra
note 39; Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 669
(1978).
51. Jones, supra note 48, at 968; cf. Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1350 (N.D. Ga.
1983) (advocate should resolve doubts in favor of client; counselor should give professional opin-
ion as to what ultimate decision of courts should be).
52. Jones, supra note 48, at 968-69; see Schwartz, supra note 50, at 677-78 (self-policing nec-
essary where there is no neutral decision maker). As Rhode observes, the problem arises because
the psychology of role-differentiated behavior, together with pressures of the marketplace, and
other forces, such as the ideology of advocacy, force lawyers to minimize the rights of others
whose interests are directly implicated. Rhode, supra note 40, at 629. As Wasserstrom explains,
role-differentiated behavior is behavior entailing a preference for a particular person's interests,
e.g., one's child or client, which may result in indifference to several moral concerns which might
otherwise be relevant. See Wasserstrom, supra note 40, at 5. The "ideology of advocacy" is the
ethical orientation the lawyer adopts to rationalize an amoral approach to the legal profession.
One tenet of this ideology is a belief in the principle of "procedural justice." It assumes that
legitimacy rests on whether a result was produced through an appropriate procedure rather than
by the intrinsic appropriateness of the result. So long as procedures are adequate, "one can act
justly by conforming to them regardless of the consequences to which one's conduct contributes."
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv.
29, 38. Simon recognizes, as do Rhode and Wasserstrom, that the moral justification of the amoral
role lessens where in fact it cannot be shown that the system is fair. See supra note 40.
One more element is at work here: The psychological notion of "cognitive dissonance:"
When there is an inconsistent thought, a person experiences an unpleasant psychological
state called cognitive dissonance. To avoid this discomfort, the individual will behave so as
to reduce the dissonance and restore balance. Applied [to lawyers] dissonance is created by
the conflict between "I believe X," but "I am advocating not X." In attempting to reduce
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A second justification for refusing to prohibit the aiding of unconscion-
able transactions is that the lawyer is the only means by which a client can
exercise autonomy in our legal system.53 Thus, the lawyer should not be
inhibited from aiding that effort. Professors Fried and Pepper have offered
variations on this theme to posit the broader declaration that a lawyer is not
morally responsible when acting in the client's interest. Pepper claims the
amoral role of an attorney is proper so long as the "conduct [he] facilitates
is above the floor of the intolerable"; 54 that is, it is not unlawful. Fried
claims the lawyer is not morally responsible wherever he aids in a wrong
that a "reasonably just legal system" permits." Applied in this context,
attorneys should be able to draft contracts which are unenforceable so long
as they are not illegal.56
There are limits to the efficacy of this argument. First, to conclude that
any act contemplated by a system is just, one must presuppose that the
system itself is just. As many commentators have observed, this is by no
means a truism. 7 Second, while "[o]ther things being equal, . . . increasing
the dissonance caused by this behavior the speaker may change his attitudes, so that his
"private belief becomes consistent with his public behavior."
Chemerinsky, Protecting Lawyers From Their Profession: Redefining the Lawyer's Role, 5 J.
LEGAL PROF. 31, 32 (1980). Professor Chemerinsky notes that cognitive dissonance, along with
other factors, tends to make the lawyer's views change to comport with those of the client. Id. at
32-34. This phenomenon, of course, would lead to even less identification with the concerns of
unrepresented parties.
53. See Fried, supra note 42; Pepper, supra note 42.
54. Pepper, supra note 42, at 617.
55. Fried, supra note 42, at 1084; see also id. at 1080-87.
56. If the distinction between illegal (void) contracts and voidable (or unenforceable) con-
tracts is tenable, attorneys should be able to assist in drafting many fraudulent contracts, most of
which are voidable rather than void. See infra text accompanying notes 198-200.
57. See supra note 40. Fried's faith in the propriety of actions so long as procedural devices
are followed is a classic example of the ideology of advocacy at work. See Fried, supra note 42, at
1080-87. Moreover, it is inconsistent with his notion that lawyers protect client autonomy, be-
cause he argues that the lawyer acts immorally where the lawyer uses a method not anticipated by
the system. Id. at 1073, 1080-81. If he is truly concerned about protecting individuals against the
tyranny of the sovereign, he would be forced to say that the lawyer is especially justified in acting
when an action is not condoned by the sovereign. Yet it is at this point that the lawyer's moral
immunity ends. For additional criticism regarding Fried's view, see Dauer & Leff, Correspon-
dence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573 (1977); Schwartz, supra note 50, at 693.
Simon has a response to the problems inherent in an ideology of advocacy. Rather than an
amoral perspective based on that ideology, Simon suggests that a lawyer-client relationship must
be based upon mutual respect for the other's autonomy, and that the lawyer must treat problems
of advocacy as problems of personal ethics, to be resolved in a manner consistent with one's own
moral notions. Simon, supra note 52, at 130-44. Simon adds that the lawyer should have the
professional duty to exercise discretion to take actions most likely to promote justice. It should be
recognized that lawyers must zealously represent clients, but the lawyer must recognize the public
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individual autonomy is morally good,"58 there is a distinction between the
value of autonomy in the abstract and the desirability of actions taken
through autonomous choice. All things are not equal where the exercise of
autonomy leads to immoral results.59 This conclusion is consistent, of
course, with a major tenet of a system built on the notion of autonomy: The
imperative that one exercise one's will in a way which will not interfere with
the autonomy of others in society.60 Sacrifice of some measure of autonomy
is essential to assure that heterogeneous people can live together peacefully
as a society.61
Moreover, the argument has even less force in the context of unconscio-
nability, because states have already.placed limits upon autonomy in this
context. The legislatures of forty-nine states have made clear that there is a
limit on the ability to bargain fully; an unconscionable contract will not be
enforced.62
As a result, neither the adversarial ethic nor the right to unfettered au-
tonomy serves as an insurmountable barrier to prohibiting a lawyer from
assisting in unconscionable conduct. It remains to be shown whether it is
appropriate to adopt such a prohibition.
dimension to his role as well. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083
(1988).
Pepper's notion that society would prohibit behavior if it were "intolerable" enough also pre-
supposes a completely rational system, perhaps one where the powerful do not have better access
to lawmakers. Even assuming Pepper is right, there are, as Professor Luban states, many reasons
society should not prohibit behavior which may be "intolerable":
We should not put into effect prohibitions that are unenforceable, or that are enforceable
only at enormous cost, or through unacceptably or disproportionately invasive means. We
should not prohibit immoral conduct if it would be too difficult to specify the conduct, or if
the laws would of necessity be vague or either over- or under-inclusive, or if enforcement
would destroy our liberties.
Luban, supra note 41, at 640.
58. Luban, supra note 41, at 639.
59. Id.
60. I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 43-47 (1974). For a utilitarian's concurrence, see
J.S. MILL, ON LIaERTY (1859) (government should not proscribe mere "self-regarding" actions,
but has a role in regulating "other-regarding" actions).
61. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 49-51 (J. Gough, ed. 1976); THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT, ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME & ROUSSEAU 179-82 (E. Barker, ed. 1980).
62. North Carolina did not adopt U.C.C. § 2-302 immediately but added it in 1971. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (1986). California adopted an unconscionability section designed to apply
to all contracts. CAL. [CIV.] CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985). Louisiana has not adopted Article 2 of
the U.C.C. but has developed a considerable amount of common and civil law on the topic. See
Hersbergen, Unconscionability: The Approach of the Louisiana Civil Code, 43 LA. L. REV. 1315
(1983).
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B. The Public Nature of the Role of Lawyer as Negotiator,
Counselor and Drafter
The central question is, of course, whether the lawyer should have du-
ties to anyone other than the client in the drafting and subsequent negotia-
tion context. The Model Code and Model Rules recognize that a lawyer
clearly has duties to the system and to third parties in a litigation context.63
Yet, the Model Code provides no guidance regarding ethics in negotiating
or drafting contexts, and the Model Rules offer only limited direction. The
Model Rules recognize that legal decisions are made in contexts other than
litigation,' but they do not fully appreciate the public nature of the law-
yer's role in a private counseling or drafting context. Lawyers are a part of
our legal system's apparatus regardless of whether a particular matter will
ever become "grist for the mills of courts."65 Yet, the Model Rules view
lawyers as officers of the court "only when they are actually or incipiently
in one."66
This focus has begun to change for two reasons. First, as indicated
above, there is no neutral decisionmaker to assure fairness or the emergence
of truth.67 While society has "an interest if not an expectation 68 concern-
ing legal matters decided in negotiation, just as it does in litigation, only
lawyers can assure fairness in non-litigation contexts. Next, because law-
yers are licensed to advise laypersons about the law, lawyers are perceived
as spokespersons for, or representatives of, the law to that group.69
The latter argument is recognized in a limited way by Model Rule 4.3,
which states that a lawyer dealing with an unrepresented person may not
state or imply that he is disinterested.7" As the comment to Model Rule 4.3
indicates, the rule is premised upon the idea that laypersons may conclude
that a lawyer is a disinterested authority regarding the law even when he
63. See infra text accompanying notes 78, 204-05; see also supra notes 43-46.
64. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2.1 (lawyer as advisor); MODEL
RULE 2.2 (lawyer as intermediary); and MODEL RULE 4.1 (duty of trustworthiness in contexts
other than before tribunal).
65. Brown & Dauer, supra note 50, at 520.
66. Id. The MODEL CODE was worse, including no references to the lawyer as counselor and
negotiator. The MODEL RULES, at least, recognize those functions, albeit in a limited way. See
supra note 64.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
68. Brown & Dauer, supra note 50, at 528.
69. Id.
70. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (1983); Brown & Dauer, supra
note 50, at 528-29.
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represents another person.7" Considering that rule together with Model
Rule 4.1, which prohibits the lawyer from making a false statement of law,
one can see a "glimmer of the recognition of the negotiating lawyer as an
official of the law."72 In fact, lawyers have been found to have responsibili-
ties to, and even a fiduciary relationship with, unrepresented persons who
act in reliance upon their statements.73 Further, duties to third parties have
explicitly been recognized in the context of drafting agreements.74
The lawyer's public function is even more clear when the lawyer drafts a
"form" contract: "[T]he lawyer is, in effect, drawing up a private constitu-
tion intended to govern the conduct of a client and masses of persons....
Here there is more than an unrepresented person. There are innumerable
unrepresented persons."' 7" As one commentator adds, "[i]f by making law
we mean imposing officially enforceable duties or creating or restricting offi-
cially enforceable rights, then automobile manufacturers make more war-
ranty law in a day than most legislatures or courts make in a year."'76 Thus,
when innumerable unrepresented persons receive a contract they assume it
71. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 comment (1983); see Brown &
Dauer, supra note 50, at 528-29; C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 617 (1986). Professor
Wolfram notes the clear potential for lawyer overreaching due to the lawyer's superior legal
knowledge: An unrepresented party might mistakenly but reasonably rely on his understanding
that the lawyer would protect his interests. Id.
72. Brown & Dauer, supra note 50, at 529.
73. See supra note 70; see, e.g., Fassihi v. Sommers, 107 Mich. App. 509, 309 N.W.2d 645
(1981); cf In re Friedman, 64 A.D.2d 70, 407 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1978) (contract for consignment of
art between broker and artist's widow deemed unconscionable, in part because broker's attorney
"explained" contract to her).
74. See ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK No. 722 (1948) (unethical
for lawyer to insert waiver previously determined to be void "as against public policy" into lease);
cf Slotkin v. Citizens Casualty Co., 614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1979) (negligent or reckless omissions
in process of settlement agreement); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App.
3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976) (negligence in drafting letter regarding status of partnership
supported cause of action against attorneys); Stare v. Tate, 21 Cal. App. 3d 432, 98 Cal. Rptr. 264
(1971) (settlement agreement reformed because attorney for husband knew of wife's mathematical
error and did not fix it).
75. Brown & Dauer, supra note 50, at 529.
76. Slawson, supra note 4, at 530. He adds that, since so much law is promulgated by stan-
dard form, it should be made democratically "with the consent of the governed." Id. Because
there is no consent where standard forms are either not read or are misunderstood, Slawson con-
cludes that standardized contracts should be enforceable only where consistent with authoritative
standards in the public law, or to nonauthoritative standards in the public interest. See also
Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECoN. 461, 484 (1974) (If
the government role is restricted to passive enforcement of private contracts, legislature essentially
delegates lawmaking in the form of standard form contracts to a private party; bias of such "legis-
lation" will inevitably be in favor of stronger party.).
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is the law (because a lawyer drafted it), when in fact, there may be some
clauses without any legal basis.77
Essentially, if the contract clause is unconscionable, the lawyer aids a
client in extracting an advantage to which he is not legally entitled. Be-
cause a court would not enforce the clause, it is difficult to see any logical
distinction between drafting an unconscionable clause and extracting a set-
tlement in a frivolous lawsuit. The latter, of course, is expressly forbidden
by both the Model Code and the Model Rules.78
There are no compelling reasons why lawyers should have greater abil-
ity to proceed with unfettered zealous advocacy in non-litigation contexts.
In fact, there are reasons why conduct should be more circumscribed in
those situations. 79 Thus, it is anomalous that a lawyer can extract an uncon-
scionable, and therefore legally baseless advantage in a negotiating context
while he could never pursue that advantage in litigation.
The authors of the Model Code and the Model Rules have not recog-
nized this anomaly. Although lawyers are permitted to withdraw if they do
not wish to aid their client in gaining an unconscionable advantage,8° they
are not required to do so. There is no prohibition against assisting their
client in achieving such results. 8 In fact, the Model Code provides some
incentives for the lawyer to offer an unconscionable clause for his client's
consideration.82
77. See supra notes 18-23.
78. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983) (prohibits lawyer from
"bring[ing] or defend[ing]" the claim); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102 (1982) (prohibits the lawyer from "knowingly advanc[ing]" such a claim). Both sections are
broad enough to prohibit frivolous settlements, and such a settlement could be set aside. See C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 71, at 596 n.12; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 555
(1979); Slotkin, 614 F.2d 301.
79. See supra notes 49-52, 67-69. Professors Hazard and White argue that it is too difficult to
enforce notions of good faith in negotiations for two reasons: First, negotiation arises in too many
contexts, from international treaties to simple contracts; second, value judgments vary too much
within the profession. See Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation to Be Trustworthy when Dealing with
Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181 (1981); White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations
on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926. Whatever force those arguments have
in general is reduced greatly in an unconscionability setting. Unconscionability generally arises in
one context, the consumer contract context. See infra notes 148-49. Moreover, lawyers may refer
for moral guidance to the legislative pronouncement. See infra text accompanying notes 194-96.
80. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1983); see MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-1 10(C)(1)(e) (1982).
81. Although the lawyer is permitted to attempt to dissuade the client, he must defer to the
client's judgment regarding objectives. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.2(a),(d) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8, 7-9 (1982). See
supra note 26. See generally Maute, supra note 26.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
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C. The Current Situation: Use of Covert Tools to Control Lawyer
Behavior
In 1967, the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Giordano 83 clearly held
that a lawyer could be disciplined for assisting in an unconscionable trans-
action. Lawyer Henneberry had represented a lender in a usurious loan.
Although the court concluded the law had been unsettled regarding
whether aiding in a usurious transaction was illegal, it found the lawyer had
engaged in "highly unconscionable and the grossest kind of overreaching" 4
to the borrower, who was elderly and of little education. The court cited no
disciplinary rule, however, and no other court has admitted to disciplining a
lawyer on those grounds.
As in the time prior to adoption of U.C.C. section 2-302, absence of any
direct prohibition may lead to unfair results where courts are unwilling to
be as forthright as was the New Jersey Supreme Court. As Karl Llewellyn,
a legal realist, 5 recognized, a flexible system of common law decision mak-
ing has a response: Use the existing tools available to respond to an injus-
tice; if the result is an unintelligible mess that reduces the predictability of
law, so be it. 6
Perhaps because decisionmakers intuitively recognize the illogic of the
Model Code and Model Rules, this inexorable common law process has
83. 49 N.J. 210, 229 A.2d 524 (1962).
84. Id. at 223, 229 A.2d at 531; see also ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK No. 722 (1948) (unethical for lawyer to insert waiver previously determined to be void "as
against public policy" into lease).
85. Llewellyn was what Luban calls a "high realist." "Low realists" are mere legal skeptics
who would posit that "what's right is whatever you can get away with." Luban, supra note 41, at
646. Conversely, the "high realists" "claim that law is a prediction of what human officials will
do in their good faith efforts to interpret and enforce authoritative rules." Id. For an example of
Llewellyn's requirement of good faith and importance of developing "baseline norms" in commer-
cial agreements, see infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., HART & SACHS, MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROCESS 565-95 (Preliminary ed.
1958); Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 702. Kessler described the process:
[T]he rules of the common law are flexible enough to enable courts to listen to their sense
of justice and to the sense of justice of the community. Just as freedom of contract gives
individual contracting parties all the needed leeway for shaping the law of contract accord-
ing to their needs, the elasticity of the common law, with rule and counterrule constantly
competing, makes it possible for courts to follow the dictates of "social desirability."
Whatever one may think about the possibility of separating the "law that is" from the "law
that ought to be," this much is certain: In the development of the common law the ideal
tends constantly to become the practice. And in this process the ideal of certainty has con-
stantly to be weighed against the social desirability of change, and very often legal cer-
tainty has to be sacrificed to progress. The inconsistencies and contradictions within the
legal system resulting from the uneven growth of the law and from conflicting ideologies
are inevitable.
Kessler, supra note 3, at 638 (emphasis added).
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begun to occur in the context of regulating the aid of unconscionable agree-
ments. Lawyers have always been and currently are prohibited from assist-
ing a client in committing fraud.87 Although commentators generally agree
that the Model Code or Model Rules prohibit activity only where the strict
common law definition of fraud is met,88 courts have disciplined lawyers in
situations where some elements of that definition were missing.8 9
The tort of fraud traditionally required proof of a false representation;9°
scienter, i.e., knowledge that the representation is false; an intention to in-
duce reliance upon the misrepresentation; actual reliance, i.e., materiality;
and damage.9' More recently, actions for negligent 92 and innocent 93 mis-
representations have served as a basis for contract rescission 94 and dam-
ages.95 Attorneys have successfully been sued in tort by nonclients for
negligent and innocent misrepresentation where it was foreseeable that reli-
87. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1982).
88. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975);
Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 669 (1981); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 71, at 698, 703-04; Note, Client Fraud and
the Lawyer - An Ethical Analysis, 62 MINN. L. REV. 89 (1977).
89. See infra notes 100- 117 and accompanying text.
90. Silence is generally not a basis for finding a misrepresentation. This requirement can be
met by failure to communicate only if actual concealment occurs, a fiduciary relationship exists, a
"half-truth" is spoken, or subsequent information renders a previously true statement false. P.
KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 737-39 (5th ed. 1984); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 71, at
722.
91. See P. KEETON, supra note 90, at 728.
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1979); P. KEETON, supra note 90,
at 729.
95. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985);
Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466
S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Roberts, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901; Haberman v.
Public Power Supply Sys., 109 Wash. 2d 107, 744 P.2d 1032 (1987). See generally P. KEETON,
supra note 90, at 745-48; 2 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 28, at 372-74.
Damages are not generally available in actions for innocent misrepresentation absent some
benefit to defendant. See, e.g., Riddle v. Lacey, 135 Mich. App. 241, 351 N.W.2d 916 (1984). See
generally P. KEETON, supra note 90, at 748-49; C. WOLFRAM supra note 71, at 721.
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ance might occur.96 Thus, a relaxation of the strict common law standard
has occurred for purposes of professional liability.97
Courts have also used "fraud" as a device to support discipline where
the lawyer's activities simply did not fit the classic definition of fraud. For
example, some cases have defined knowledge as being inferred whenever an
attorney "should" know.9" Arguably, this is a negligence standard.99
An especially interesting example of how courts can create intention to
defraud can be found in Pickus v. Virginia State Bar." In Pickus, a bank
that agreed to lend the client money to refinance existing deeds of trust
instructed Pickus to satisfy the prior deeds of trust and to obtain title insur-
ance. Pickus obtained title insurance, endorsed the bank checks, and
turned them over to the client because the client assured him that the ear-
lier liens would be satisfied. In fact, they were not. The court accepted for
purposes of argument that scienter was required in order to discipline the
attorney for misrepresentation, but concluded that Pickus "knew" the prior
liens were not satisfied while representing that they had been. In so doing,
the court rejected Pickus' argument that he had acted unknowingly upon
the representations of his client, not because there was any evidence Pickus
had reason to disbelieve his client, but because the court concluded that
Pickus had a fiduciary duty to the bank in receiving and handling the
funds. °1 While Pickus' behavior might support a claim for negligent mis-
96. Generally, privity serves as a bar to suits by nonclients. See R. MALLEN & J. SMITH,
supra note 28, at 376 n.1. But see, e.g., Eisenberg, 766 F.2d 770 (negligent); Slotkin, 614 F.2d 301
(negligent or reckless); Norman v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 693 F. Supp. 1259 (D. Mass. 1988)
(negligent); Lubin v. Sybedon Corp., 699 F. Supp. 7425 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (negligent); Pasternak v.
Sagittarius Recording Co., 617 F. Supp. 1514 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (negligent); In re McGrath, 96
A.D.2d 267, 468 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1983) (negligent); Stinson v. Brand, 738 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. 1987)
(negligent); Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 128 Wis. 2d 221, 381 N.W.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1985)
(innocent); Roberts, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (negligent); see also supra note 90.
97. Liability for negligent failure to disclose has been found against other professionals. See,
e.g., Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Kentucky, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (consigner
has duty to ascertain information and disclose to buyers of mare); Mathis v. Yondata Corp., 125
Misc. 2d 383, 480 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1984) (agent for computer software seller liable for negligent
misrepresentation); see also Annotation, Liability of Public Accountant to Third Parties, 46 A.L.R.
3d 979, 990-91 (accountants).
98. See, e.g., In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967) (lawyer charged with knowledge
where reasonable lawyer would know); State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 270 A.2d 284 (1970)
(attorney has duty to investigate client perjury where he knows or through professional experience
should reasonably suspect that client is lying); cf. ABA Formal Op. 346 (1982) (lawyer who ac-
cepts as true the facts a tax client gives when lawyer should know further inquiry would disclose
facts are untrue aids in giving fraudulent tax opinion or, at minimum, violates DR 6-101(A)).
99. See P. KEETON, supra note 90, at 182-85.
100. 232 Va. 5, 348 S.E.2d 202 (1986).
101. Id. at -, 348 S.E.2d at 205.
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representation,"'2 it did not appear to rise to the level of an intentional mis-
representation. Yet, Pickus was disciplined for intentional
misrepresentation.
"Fraud" has been found where other elements of the common law defi-
nition were missing. For example, the attorneys in In re Carroll1 °3 and
Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Associ-
ation v. Crary 1  were disciplined for assisting in fraudulent testimony,
even though opposing counsel was aware of the fraud in each case. Thus,
reliance was missing.' ° 5 in re A 106 is a classic example of the evolution of
fraud theory. There the court held that, in the future, lawyers would be
disciplined for failure to withdraw where the client offers "misleading,"
though not false, testimony. 10 7 Although the courts in Crary, Carroll and
In re A were concerned with the integrity of the legal system as well as
harm to individuals, it is clear that courts are willing to manipulate the
fraud doctrine to serve their purposes when application of the strict defini-
tion would result in an unjust or unwise result. In fact, Model Rule
3.3(a)(4), with no reference to fraud, states simply that a lawyer who offers
evidence to a tribunal and who comes to learn of the falsity of a material
fact must take remedial action.
Moreover, courts have disciplined for "fraud" for impropriety outside
the litigation process. In In re Sherre,'0° a lawyer was disciplined for in-
volvement in sham transactions. The court rejected the argument that a
lawyer should not be disciplined for committing fraud unless someone suf-
fers damage.1" 9 In re Segall11 o is analogous to In re A although it arose in a
102. Assuming Pickus was a fiduciary to the bank, a theory for which the court offers no
support, he would have a duty to transmit information. Although failure to investigate might
support a claim for negligence, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958), there is
no doctrine (absent proof of recklessness) that elevates such failure to the level of an intentional
tort.
103. 244 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951).
104. 245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976).
105. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 844 (1977).
106. 276 Or. 225, 554 P.2d 479 (1976).
107. In re A involved testimony in a divorce case. Husband, who inherited his mother's estate
upon her death, was questioned by the judge regarding her status. The judge asked where the
husband's mother was at the time, and he replied she was "in Salem." In fact, she was dead and
buried in Salem. In a hearing after the judge had rendered his verdict, the husband testified he
was told "to answer all questions truthfully during the divorce suit but not to volunteer." Id. at
-, 554 P.2d at 482. The court did not discipline the attorney because it found the law regarding
the lawyer's duties in such a situation to be confusing. Id. at -, 554 P.2d at 487.
108. 68 Ii. 2d 56, 368 N.E.2d 912 (1977).
109. Id. at 61, 368 N.E.2d at 914. Several courts have found misrepresentation absent dam-
age. See, e.g., Garlow v. State Bar of California, 30 Cal. 3d 912, 640 P.2d 1106, 180 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1982); In re Price, 429 N.E.2d 961 (Ind. 1982); In re Labendz, 95 N.J. 273, 471 A.2d 21
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negotiation context. In Segall, a lawyer was disciplined for sending checks
to his credit card companies for very low amounts compared to his debts.
Letters accompanied the checks indicating that the checks were intended to
satisfy any claims. Although there were no false statements in the letters,
the court, "finding fraud whenever there is conduct 'calculated to
deceive' "' Ifound the lawyer had committed fraud because he failed to
add in his letter the amount actually due.I"a The dissent disagreed, claim-
ing the letters evidenced a lack of good faith but were not fraudulent." 3
In addition, other courts have found fraud where they concluded an
attorney acted unfairly towards a third party. For example, in State ex rel.
Nebraska State Bar v. Addison," 4 the court disciplined counsel not for a
false statement, but for a "fraudulent" failure to speak and correct a misim-
pression suffered by a hospital administrator regarding insurance coverage.
Unlike the more typical case,' there was no evidence in Addison that the
attorney uttered any half-truths; he was found to have acted fraudulently by
remaining silent. Addison did not commit a fraud in its traditional sense. " 6
The duties imposed by the court are instead quite similar to those imposed
by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 161, which confers a
duty to speak if an actor knows another has a misimpression regarding a
basic element to the transaction, whether or not he caused the confusion." 7
Some courts have recognized the disastrous effect that the use of "covert
tools" can have. As a result, they have disciplined attorneys while admit-
ting an absence of fraud. In In re McGrath,"8 the court found that negli-
gent misrepresentation of policy limits indicated a lack of reasonable care
and therefore adversely impacted on the lawyer's ability to practice law.
(1984); In re Conti, 75 N.J. 114, 380 A.2d 691 (1977); In re Pridgen, 288 S.C. 96, 341 S.E.2d 376
(1986).
110. 117 Ill. 2d 1, 509 N.E.2d 988 (1987).
111. Id. at 7, 509 N.E.2d at 991 (quoting In re Armentrout, 99 Ill.2d 242, 251, 457 N.E.2d
1262, 1266 (1983)).
112. Id. In addition, Segall sent the letter directly to his creditors rather than to the credi-
tors' lawyers, and did not mention that one dispute had been reduced to a judgment. Id.
113. Id. The dissenting opinion noted that the attorney's intentions were clear from reading
the letter, and that each company was free to reject the offer of settlement but chose to accept it.
Id. at 10, 509 N.E.2d at 992 (Clark, J., dissenting).
114. 226 Neb. 585, 412 N.W.2d 855 (1987).
115. See, e.g., Slotkin, 614 F.2d at 301 (The attorney listed other insurance policies for oppos-
ing counsel but refrained from listing an umbrella policy).
116. See supra note 90.
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
118. 96 A.D.2d 267, 468 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1983).
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The court disciplined him for violating Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility DR 1-102(A)(6).
In In re Hiller,"9 the lawyer for a creditor deposed defendants. He
learned (but did not believe) that there existed an oral agreement that the
loan from the creditor to the debtor was not due until the creditor sold his
land. The lawyer instructed his client to convey the land to the lawyer's
secretary, with a signed document to reconvey for a nominal amount after a
suit for the debt was completed. Although the debtors reviewed the convey-
ance documents, they were unaware that a reconveyance agreement had
been executed as part of the deal. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the
finding by the trial court that the lawyer did not intend to mislead.' 20
However, it found that misrepresentation could occur absent intent, stating
that parties "should be able to rely on express or implied representa-
tions." 12 1 The court added that "[a] person must be able to trust a lawyer's
word.., without having to search for equivocation, hidden meanings, de-
liberate half-truths or camouflaged escape hatches."' 122 As a result, Hiller
was disciplined for violating Model Code DR 1-102(A)(4), which prohibits
an attorney from "engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation."'1
23
The Florida Supreme Court adopted a finding that there was no fraud in
Florida Bar v. Davis.124 Yet, it disciplined counsel, who also was an officer
and director for a seller of timeshares in condominiums, for violating Model
Code DR 7-102(A)(7).' 25 The court found that counsel "fail[ed] to provide
adequate protection for purchasers."' 126 He did not provide warranty deeds
and title insurance, and did not insist that the seller stop selling timeshares
after foreclosure proceedings were commenced against the seller
corporation.
The Arizona Supreme Court reached the same result in In re Kerst-
ing.12 7 Despite a finding of no specific intent to defraud, the court deter-
mined that counsel for a land purchaser and developer violated Model Code
119. 298 Or. 526, 694 P.2d 540 (1985).
120. Id. at 534, 694 P.2d at 544.
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also In re McGrath, 96 A.D.2d 267, 468 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1983) (negligent misrep-
resentation of limits of insurance discussion is grounds for discipline because the lawyer's negli-
gence reflected adversely on his ability to practice law).
123. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1982).
124. 19 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1982).
125. Id. at 327. The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102)(A)(7)
(1982) provides that a lawyer may not counsel or assist a client in illegal or fraudulent activities.
126. Id.
127. 151 Ariz. 171, 726 P.2d 587 (1986).
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DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 7-102(A)(7) because he failed, among other
things, to disclose risks of exchanging secured notes on land sold for substi-
tute mortgages on other, undeveloped property. 128 The court noted that the
lawyer knew the project was risky, and the "lot purchasers were unsophisti-
cated, out-of-state investors who bought the land sight-unseen .... 29
Although it is commendable that these courts do not attempt to fit these
cases into a fraud theory where the elements of fraud are missing, confusion
remains. Courts make general references to rules prohibiting dishonesty,
fitness to practice, and misrepresentation, but make no attempt to define the
elements of the offense giving rise to the discipline. Rather, it appears that
if it "smells bad," an act should be the subject of a disciplinary action. 130 In
fact, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited no disciplinary rule in support of
its decision in In re Giordano.
Such an ad hoc and "covert" approach does more than simply raise
problems regarding the predictability of law. 131 It raises concerns of a con-
stitutional dimension. Disciplinary hearings are quasi-criminal in nature.132
As a result, the attorney is entitled to some due process protection, includ-
ing fair notice of what constitutes a violation of the disciplinary rules. 1
33
Notice arguably cannot exist unless "fraud" is expressly defined in the disci-
128. He also violated MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3)
(1982), prohibiting the lawyer from concealing that which he is required by law to reveal, and
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1982), which prohibits
knowingly making false statements of law or fact.
129. In re Kersting, 151 Ariz. at 176, 726 P.2d at 592. The court also noted that purchasers
were not people with experience in real estate transactions; rather, they were "working people -
all eager to buy land in Arizona .... Id.; cf. Lupoff v. Hartog, 237 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) (lawyer/mortgagee who drafted agreement was estopped from claiming statutory re-
quirements necessary for mortgagor to collect interest and attorney fees were not met; although
no attorney/client relationship existed, it was "unconscionable" for lawyer to exploit widow with
no counsel).
130. This author is not suggesting that attorneys in the preceding cases were not guilty of
culpable conduct; rather, the suggestion is that clearer rules providing notice of what constitutes a
violation are necessary. See infra notes 132-33.
131. See supra text accompanyings notes 12, 86.
132. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1968); Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1210
(2d Cir. 1972).
133. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 550. "Life, liberty and property [cannot] ... be taken by
virtue of a statute whose terms [are] 'so vague, indefinite and uncertain' that one cannot determine
their meaning." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 513 (1978) (citing Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939)). The ABA has recognized the right of an attorney to due
process protection by providing the attorney with procedural safeguards during disciplinary hear-
ings. See ABA, American Bar Association Standards for Lawyer Disciplinary and Disability Pro-
ceedings §§ 8.32-8.40 (1980). The Oregon Supreme Court avoided a notice problem in In re A by
announcing that lawyers would be disciplined in the future but not disciplining the lawyer in that
case. See supra text and accompanying note 107.
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plinary rule as including negligent and innocent misrepresentation, or un-
conscionability. If such behavior is to be the subject of discipline, it should
be explicitly prohibited.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE: OVERT REGULATION
As suggested earlier, attorneys, as representatives of the legal system,
should not subvert the legal judgment of forty-nine legislatures by assisting
in unconscionable transactions. Moreover, courts have begun to show some
willingness to use covert or undefined means to deter conduct they view as
unfair. The system would be more predictable, as well as fairer to attor-
neys, if the requirement to refrain from assisting in unconscionable transac-
tions were made explicit. Therefore, the following rule should be
promulgated by disciplinary authorities:
A lawyer shall not assist in the preparation of a written instrument
containing terms which are unconscionable. A lawyer may assist in
such preparation where there is a basis for concluding the terms are
not unconscionable that is not frivolous, including a good faith argu-
ment for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
This rule essentially parallels Model Rule 3.1, which prohibits the lawyer
from bringing or defending suits unless there is a basis which is not
frivolous. 134
V. SOME CONCERNS AND A RESPONSE
A. The Ambiguity of Unconscionability Theory
Several concerns have been raised concerning the promulgation of the
proposed rule. Model Rule 1.2 was amended to exclude a prohibition
against drafting legally prohibited contracts. The legislative history of the
Model Rules indicates that the major reason was that the drafters found an
inherent ambiguity in the phrase "prohibited by law."' 3 5 Moreover, some
commentators indicate that prohibiting "unfairness" in negotiation is much
too vague to be a subject of discipline.13 6 These concerns are understanda-
ble given the lack of consistency in defining fraud.
134. Professor Schwartz suggests a rule which, among other things, would prevent the lawyer
from assisting a client when he "knows or it is obvious that such assistance is intended or will be
used . . . to allow the client to obtain an unconscionable advantage over another person."
Schwartz, supra note 50, at 685-86. The proposed rule is consistent with the approach taken in
the MODEL RULES. See infra note 160.
135. ABA, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT 32 (1987).
136. See supra note 79.
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To avoid these problems, the proposed rule prohibits the lawyer only
from assisting the client in reaching an unconscionable agreement. While
some commentators have suggested that the unconscionability doctrine is
also too vague, 137 the official comment elaborates slightly by stating that the
principle is one of "prevention of oppression and unfair surprise."'138 While
these terms are also flexible, there is an existing body of law to be con-
sulted, 139 and this body of law provides a useful, analytical framework in
which all unconscionability cases can be considered."4 Thus, a lawyer
could easily learn whether a particular contract or clause is unconscionable,
and would only be guilty of violating the proposed rule if he nevertheless
drafted it.
For example, unfair surprise involves some deception by artifice, such as
hiding a clause in a mass of fine print or phrasing it in an unintelligible
manner. 141 The requirement of unfair surprise indicates that the substance
of the agreement must be unfair. Oppression connotes duress or inability to
choose contract terms, coupled with onerous terms which either impair the
fair meaning of the bargained terms or are manifestly unreasonable. 42
Moreover, courts have placed a judicial gloss on the definition of uncon-
scionability which renders it a workable concept. Most courts have
adopted a definition like the one articulated by Judge J. Skelly Wright in
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. :143 "Unconscionability has gen-
erally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the
part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasona-
bly favorable to the other party."" That is, some form of procedural abuse
137. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 16; Epstein, supra note 16.
138. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1977).
139. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 681, 689; Ellinghaus, supra note 16, at 761.
140. Spanogle, supra note 4, at 943.
141. Id. Ellinghaus would refer to this problem as "misleading bargaining conduct." El-
linghaus, supra note 16, at 763-65.
142. Spanogle, supra note 4, at 944-46; Ellinghaus, supra note 16, at 765-68 (inequality of
bargaining position). The requirement of reasonableness is used throughout Article 2 and has not
been attacked as vague. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (good faith observance of reasonable stan-
dards in the trade); U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (open price term may be filled with reasonable price);
U.C.C. § 2-306 (no unreasonably disproportionate changes in quantity in output or requirement
contracts); U.C.C. § 2-309 (time for shipment absent agreement is reasonable time).
143. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
144. Id. at 449; see also Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985); Preston v.
Kruezer, 641 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Truta v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc., 193 Cal. App.
3d 802, 238 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1982); Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144
(1972); Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138 (Pa. Super. 1985). See generally J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, at 187 (nearly all cases are consistent with the Williams
analysis). Some courts are even more specific. See, e.g., Bekins Bar v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 461-63
(Utah 1983) (factors include absence of meaningful choice; circumstances at the time of the con-
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in the formation of a contract must be coupled with some substantive un-
fairness.1 45 As many commentators recognize, courts essentially perform a
balancing test, requiring some quantum of each type of abuse.
14 6
It may be argued that it is too hard to predict the outcome of such a
balancing test. However, the very notion of unconscionability would be
useless if a rigid definition were adopted. Lawyers could simply draft to the
threshold of unconscionability, recreating the problem in a slightly different
context, thus defeating the purpose of the doctrine.
1 47
Moreover, most unconscionability cases tend to arise in similar and eas-
ily identified contexts. White and Summers suggest that most unconsciona-
bility problems can be grouped into a few categories. The procedural aspect
of unconscionability is relatively easy to find: most cases involve consumer
contracts. 48 A judicial finding of procedural unconscionability, or lack of
meaningful choice, "is usually founded upon a recipe consisting of one or
more parts of assumed consumer ignorance and several parts of seller's
guile."' 4 9
With respect to the substantive component of unconscionability, White
and Summers conclude that most cases "can still be lumped under one of
two headings: Excessive price-cases and cases in which the creditor unduly
restricted the debtor's remedies or unduly expanded his own remedial
tract; use of boiler plate contracts; excessive price or interest; incomprehensible language to the
layman; an overall imbalance in obligations; exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisticated
and uneducated; oppression or unfair surprise; and lack of opportunity for meaningful negotia-
tion); accord Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976).
145. Spanogle, supra note 4, at 948-49. Professor Leff was the first to recognize explicitly that
unconscionability should be analyzed in this manner. Leff, supra note 16, at 489-528.
146. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, at 199; Spanogle, supra note 4, at 950. Spa-
nogle suggests that the more onerous the term, the less emphasis the court places on the method
used to create the clause. Id. Courts in equity cases preceding U.C.C. § 2-302 did the same thing.
See Spanogle, supra note 4; Ellinghaus, supra note 16; Davenport, supra note 16.
147. See Ellinghaus, supra note 16; Spanogle, supra, note 4; see also J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 15, at 186-87 (not possible to define unconscionability precisely, but cases use
consistent analysis).
148. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, at 184. Some cases do arise in commercial
contexts, but most unconscionability claims are rejected as parties are viewed as having given
informed and voluntary consent. See, e.g., Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d
571 (8th Cir. 1975); United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449 (E.D.
Mich. 1972); Architectural Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 495, 333 N.Y.S.2d 818
(1972). But see, e.g., Weaver, 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 15, at 205-10; Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40
S.W. L.J. 1065, 1080 (1986) (with few exceptions, unconscionability found in commercial context
only where unsophisticated business people have no ability to select suppliers or negotiate terms).
149. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, at 187.
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rights."'1 50 One practitioner suggests that most unconscionability problems
can be resolved by the printing of forms in clear, readable type on opaque
paper, and by assuring that both parties have mutual benefits and
obligations. 151
Finally, the concept of unconscionability is no more flexible or vague
than several notions that any competent lawyer is assumed to be capable of
understanding. For example, a lawyer should know that a duty in negli-
gence is found where the probability and gravity of harm outweigh the bur-
den of taking adequate precautions.152 A lawyer should also be capable of
giving meaning to such terms as "reasonableness,""15  "due process,"' 154
"equal protection,"' 5 5 and "contracts or combinations in restraint of trade
or commerce."
156
Viewed in isolation, these terms are vague, but they have served as fod-
der for practicing lawyers, judges and commentators alike, and nobody has
suggested that attorneys should not be held responsible for comprehending
their meaning. An attorney is trained to deal with uncertainty and to de-
rive some meaning from terms with reference to judicial decisions. Lawyers
are consulted for the very reason that they can unravel ambiguity. In the
context of unconscionability, there is ample case law construing the term,
and commentators have successfully found a structure in which to analyze
150. Id. at 189. An "excessive price" is one which returns too great a profit, yields too great a
return on invested capital, or is substantially higher than that of other merchants. Id. at 191.
Examples of remedy meddling are where a credit seller attempts to set liquidated damage penal-
ties for nonacceptance, to limit his liability for consequential damages, to disclaim some or all
warranty liability, or to include a waiver of defense clause. Id. at 194.
151. See Davenport, supra note 16, at 148-49. For additional guidance, see supra notes 138-
50. In those few circumstances where it is unclear whether a contract would be construed as
unconscionable, the lawyer is protected by the objective standard of care which the proposed rule
imposes. See infra text accompanying notes 158-66.
152. This formula is the "Learned Hand balancing test" articulated in United States v. Car-
roll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1969). As Professor Keeton states:
The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question - whether the
plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct. It is
therefore not surprising to find that the problem of duty is as broad as the whole law of
negligence, and that no universal test for it ever has been formulated. It is a shorthand
statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself .... But it should be
recognized that "duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to
protection .... No better general statement can be made than that the courts will find a
duty where, in general, reasonable persons would recognize it and agree that it exists.
P. KEETON, supra note 90, at 357-59.
153. See supra note 142. See generally P. KEETON, supra note 90, at 173-75, 357-59.
154. L. TRIBE, supra note 133, at 421-55, 474-77.
155. Id. at 991-1136.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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unconscionability problems. I57 A competent lawyer cannot, therefore, ar-
gue he has no way of analyzing unconscionability problems.I"'
Moreover, attorneys are protected by standards built into the proposed
rule. Because a clause must have a reasonable legal basis, the proposed rule
imposes a requirement that the lawyer investigate case law prior to drafting
an instrument. However, the Model Rules already require this by demand-
ing competence 159 and informed consent following full disclosure of rele-
vant facts and law.' 60
Further, a lawyer would not be disciplined every time a judge concludes
a clause is unconscionable. 61  Because an objective standard is built into
the proposed rule, 162 a lawyer would be protected from discipline whenever
a reasonably prudent, well-informed attorney could find there is a basis for
157. See supra notes 138-5 1.
158. Like Justice Stewart regarding obscenity, Professor White's students knew unconsciona-
bility when they saw it, concluding it is inappropriate to use exaggeration and distortion when
dealing with laymen. White, supra note 79, at 930 n. 13. This author's students sometimes com-
plain about the vagueness of the term, but they too generally can be made to admit they know it
when they see it.
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1982). Because § 2-302(2) allows the court to con-
sider the commercial setting, purpose and effect of a clause in determining unconscionability,
competent representation would require the lawyer to be familiar with the client's business. One
would assume competent representation of a corporate client would always include such a duty.
If there are certain facts which the lawyer, though reasonably diligent, was unaware he would be
protected by the objective standard at the proposed rule. See infra note 165 and accompanying
text.
160. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2, 1.4 (1983).
161. The determination of unconscionability is a question of law for the judge. See U.C.C.
§ 2-302(1) (1978).
162. An argument can be made that the proposed rule, as well as MODEL RULE 3.1, does not
create an objective standard as there is no requirement that the conclusion have a reasonable basis.
In fact, that term was deleted from the final draft of MODEL RULE 3.1. See PROPOSED FINAL
DRAFT MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1981). However, the predecessor
of MODEL RULE 3.1, MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(1), stated the attorney was precluded from
bringing suit if "he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or
maliciously injure." MODEL RULE 3.1 relies on an external standard, the status of the law, rather
than upon the subjective intention of the lawyer or client. The comment to MODEL RULE 3.1
specifically states it creates an "objective standard," and Professor Hazard, reporter to the
MODEL RULES, observed that the rule, rather than referring to such intentions, requires "a mini-
mum of merit." See ABA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 119-20. It is difficult to imagine how it could be determined that a claim had no merit
other than by considering what an ordinary lawyer exercising reasonable prudence would do if
similarly situated. Given the necessity of objective input, this author would prefer to see MODEL
RULE 3.1 amended, and the proposed rule adopted, with a candid reference to the reasonable
attorney. See generally Note, A Lawyer's Duty to Reject Groundless Litigation, 26 WAYNE L. REV.
1566 (1980). In the interest of consistency, however, the rule is drafted to conform with MODEL
RULE 3.1 as it currently is drafted.
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concluding that a clause is conscionable. 163 Just as an attorney has a re-
sponsibility to make some judgment concerning the merits of a lawsuit prior
to filing a complaint," 4 an attorney would have a responsibility to attempt
to predict whether a clause previously not considered by a court would be
unconscionable. However, if the law is unclear regarding the effect of a
particular clause or contract, the lawyer would be protected so long as his
choice regarding resolution of the conflict is a well-informed one. 161
In addition, the caveat that a good faith argument for extension, modifi-
cation or reversal of present law may serve as a basis for a finding that a
clause is conscionable parallels Model Rule 3.1 and enables an attorney,
within the bounds of conscionability, to pursue zealously the objectives of
the client and to assert that a clause that is conscionable where the law is
unclear. 16 6 Thus, the proposed rule is clearer than a general exhortation to
"be fair." It simply requires that an attorney be aware of existing caselaw
and act accordingly.
B. The Efficacy of "Unenforceable" Rules
A second concern of some commentators is that, since violations occur
in private settings, a prohibition of this sort may be essentially unenforce-
able.' 67 A weakening of respect for all rules may follow the recognition that
lawyers probably will not get "caught."' 168 However, the unconscionable
clause may become public, especially if contained in a form contract, at
163. Cf. R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 28. But cf. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 71 (stan-
dard of care is question of law in discipline). Schwartz advocates an objective standard in regulat-
ing the lawyer's conduct as a nonadvocate, in part to allow adjustment for future developments in
the law. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 689.
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 provides that an attorney must certify that a complaint is well
grounded in fact and warranted by existing law. All circuit courts have recognized the rule's
objective requirement of undertaking a reasonable inquiry regarding the law and facts. Vairo,
Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 205-07; see Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New
Federal Rule 11: A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 186-89 (1985).
165. Cf. Aloy v. Mash, 38 Cal. 3d 413, 696 P.2d 656, 212 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1985) (lawyer
required to be familiar with caselaw before making legal judgment; not liable for malpractice if
well-informed prediction of change in law mistaken); Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. McMul-
lan, 801 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1986) (objective standard used to determine whether lawyer believed
pleading satisfied FED. R. Civ. P. 11; negligent failure to research claims violates rule); In re Curl,
171 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1965) (no reasonable lawyer would take his client's word regarding what a
judgment meant).
166. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (1982); Schwartz, supra note 50, at 686, 689. Thus,
fears regarding vagueness of law unless the case arises in a "typical" unconscionability setting are
reduced.




which time a lawyer could be subject to investigation. Reports of such
cases could have some deterrent value. Because lawyers drafting such
clauses, most likely represent institutions, they and the organizations to
which they belong can quickly spread the word that certain clauses are not
acceptable.
To the extent enforcement is unlikely, it should be noted that enforce-
ment of the Model Code or Model Rules in general is erratic. 6 9 This
presents two choices: Admit that all the rules are rarely enforced and, as a
result, give up on promulgating rules; or, recognize that functions other
than enforcement are served by promulgating rules.
The logic that rules should not be promulgated absent a strong likeli-
hood of enforcement has not been persuasive in many legal contexts. 7 0 For
example, many citizens continually evade traffic and income tax statutes;
yet, we see no groundswell of support for their abolition or weakened sup-
port for other criminal prohibitions. 7' Similarly, it would be difficult to
assume that a rule requiring a lawyer to refrain from aiding in an uncon-
scionable transaction would lead inevitably to a lack of respect for, or ad-
herence to, other rules. 7 ' Moreover, the drafters of the Model Rules
clearly did not allow such argument to deter them from drafting other rules
that are particularly difficult to enforce.173
Thus, rather than focusing only on enforcement, we should recognize
the proposed rule's symbolic and pedagogic functions.'74 First, it may have
some deterrent effect.' 75 Additionally, there are honest lawyers who would
rather not commit acts they find to be morally abhorrent. They would
probably prefer to tell a client that the Model Code or Model Rules prohibit
an action, rather than that they find it personally distasteful.'76 Thus, the
169. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 50, at 682; Martyn, Lawyer Competence: Beyond the
Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705 (1981); Schneyer, Review Symposium: The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and Enforcement, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 939, 945-46.
170. Rhode, supra note 40, at 647-49.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4.1 (trustworthiness in dealing
with third parties when not before a tribunal); 8.1 (responsibility to report wrongdoing of other
members of the bar).
174. Rhode, supra note 40, at 647-49.
175. See Schwartz, supra note 50, at 682.
176. Id.; Rhode, supra note 40, at 648 (citing a survey of 1200 business executives who indi-
cated that a primary function of industry ethical codes is to fortify individuals who would like to
"refuse an unethical request impersonally"); see Brenner & Molander, Is the Ethics of Business
Changing?, HARV. Bus. REV. 57, 68 (1977). Professor Rhode concludes that more demanding
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proposed rule would provide a "reinforcement" for views privately held.'77
Moreover, it removes any incentive the Model Rules currently provide at-
torneys to draft such clauses. 1 78
The pedagogic function is served by telling lawyers what society ex-
pects. If a code articulates only the absolute minimum decency required,
"[t]he consequence may be socialization to the lowest common denomina-
tor of conduct that a highly self-interested constituency will publicly brand
as deviant."' 179 The Model Code and Model Rules have the ability to create
a custom above the lowest common denominator, and they should fulfill
that function.
Llewellyn recognized the importance of creating a custom above the
lowest common denominator in his discussion of a need for "baseline"
norms, or limits on behavior. He noted that "[b]oth ways and norms of
business practice may be firm at the center, but they are hazy at the edge;
they offer little sureness to guide in deciding the outside and unusual
case."' 8 To supply some clarity, he believed the law should create norms.
For example, usage of trade or custom in the U.C.C. is composed of "us-
ages currently observed by the great majority of decent dealers, even though
dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree."' 18 1 Contracting parties are
expected to adhere to notions of mercantile good faith and fair dealing. 182
Should we as a profession essentially make the statement that lawyers need
not adhere to such a standard? The message that approach conveys is
deplorable.
C. Impact on the Attorney-Client Relationship
Another concern is that a rule barring a lawyer from participating in
unconscionable conduct will hamper the attorney-client relationship be-
cause the client may feel less inclined to confide in the lawyer if he antici-
standards can provide "protective coloration" to attorneys who wish to do the right thing, but
who are unwilling to appear sanctimonious. Rhode, supra note 40, at 648-49.
177. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 682.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
179. Rhode, supra note 40, at 647.
180. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 722 n.45 (1931); Mooney, Old Kon-
tract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial
Law, I1 VILL. L. REV. 213, 221 n.14 (1966).
181. U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 5 (1978) (emphasis added). According to Mooney, the three
most important baselines incorporated into the U.C.C. are that: Legal obligations arise from the
"agreement in fact" of the parties; commercial usage is the focal point of analysis rather than
technical contract rules; and parties are always bound by rules requiring mercantile good faith and
fair dealing. Mooney, supra note 180, at 222.
182. See U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 2-103.
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pates lectures rather than help. That is, the client may fail to disclose all
relevant facts for fear that a lawyer will refuse to assist him in reaching his
goal.' 83 There are several responses to this concern. First, the lawyer al-
ready has the responsibility to apprise the client of the unconscionability of
his act.' 84 Both Model Code EC 7-8 and Model Rule 1.2 suggest that the
lawyer should disclose possible harsh results that may arise from the impo-
sition of an unconscionable clause.' 85 Moreover, Model Rule 1.4 requires
that the client be so advised.' 86 As Elihu Root once observed, "[a]bout half
the practice of a decent lawyer ... consists in telling [his] clients that they
are damned fools and should stop."'
1 8 7
Second, as discussed above, promulgation of a rule prohibiting such
assistance allows the lawyer to couch his refusal in terms of his objective
responsibilities rather than to give a lecture on social responsibility. Third,
there are several studies indicating that professional rules have little impact
on clients' candor with lawyers. 8 8 Instead, full disclosure is generally seen
as a requirement of securing competent legal advice. Finally, any claim
that clients may be fearful of disclosure to attorneys regarding unconsciona-
ble acts is fanciful, because the proposed rule does not require disclosure of
any client confidences. It simply requires that the attorney refrain from
assisting in that effort. The attorney must withdraw, but will not be asked
to disclose his client's intentions.' 8 9 Even assuming clients feel uncomforta-
ble discussing such issues, "the alternative of allowing lawyers to cooperate
in bringing about unjust results may be too high a price to pay to relieve the
minds of clients who have those concerns."' 19
183. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 683.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See supra note 25.
187. Quoted in A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 4 (1976).
188. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 683 (citing Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth and Judicial
Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1073 (1975)); Y.
KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 592-96 (4th ed. 1974); see also
Subin, The Lawyer As Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L.
REV. 1091, 1163-64 (1985).
189. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1983) and MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1982) would require withdrawal as the attorney
would otherwise violate a disciplinary rule. In fact, the MODEL CODE and MODEL RULES specifi-
cally forbid attorneys from disclosing client's future intentions absent exceptional circumstances.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1982).
190. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 684; accord Goldman, Confidentiality, Rules, and Codes of
Ethics, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 8, 14 ("promise of complicity in wrongdoing is too high a price to
pay for a chance to be let in on the intention to commit it"); Subin, supra note 188, at 1167 (If
clients keep matters to themselves, wherein lies the mischief?). Schwartz also recognizes the con-
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The final concern prohibiting a lawyer from assisting in unconscionable
contracts is that a client is denied help in achieving legal ends which are
neither criminal nor fraudulent.' 91 This is analogous to Pepper's concern
that we thereby deny clients' rights to first class citizenship - meaningful
access to law "to ease and enable the private attainment of individual or
group goals," 192 regardless of the morality of those goals. Assuming this
argument has any force when referring to the lawyer's right to act amorally
when not prohibited by law,193 it has none here. The only right we "de-
prive" clients of exercising through lawyers is one they cannot exercise, or
at least enforce, themselves. Although persuasive arguments can and have
been made that lawyers should be held responsible for aiding in immoral
though not illegal acts, 194 promulgators of rules need not go that far here.
This is the easy case. Positive law has been enacted prohibiting people from
using courts to impose unconscionable terms upon others.195 Thus, a limi-
tation on the right to attain such private goals already exists. A prohibition
imposed on lawyers simply makes clear that lawyers may not be used for
that purpose either. 196
One issue remains, however, concerning whether lawyers should be pro-
hibited from assisting in drafting lawful, albeit unconscionable, agree-
ments. 197  An argument against this prohibition might be that, while
fraudulent contracts are void, and therefore analogous to "illegal" con-
tracts, 198 unconscionable contracts are merely voidable, or unenforceable,
cern for the danger that standards may be imposed by the elite sector of the bar upon some who
are not fairly represented, but rightly concludes that minorities or the disadvantaged would be
benefitted, not disadvantaged by the rule. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 685. Moreover, it seems
fair to assume that those persons or corporations strong enough to impose unconscionable con-
tracts upon others probably have representatives working within the ABA or state bars who are
sensitive to their interests.
191. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 684.
192. Pepper, supra note 42, at 616.
193. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
194. See supra text 57-61 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 62.
196. See supra note 134.
197. Some commentators suggest that a limitation on the lawyer's abilities of this sort would
put a person who has no lawyer in a better position than one with a lawyer, since the former's
activities are more circumscribed. See Hazard, supra note 79; White, supra note 79. This limita-
tion does not create a problem in the unconscionability context because the other person will not
be in a position to take advantage of the drafter. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
198. Contracts with an illegal object are void ab initio. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3,
at 327. Two reasons are cited: The court may see its refusal as a sanction to inappropriate con-
duct, and it may regard enforcement of the promise as an improper use of judicial machinery. Id.
at 327-28. As Farnsworth observes, use of the term "illegal" is somewhat misleading as no pen-
alty is necessarily imposed. Id. at 327. In fact, there are several techniques available to courts to
enforce such contracts where appropriate. Id. at 352-68.
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at the option of the person harmed. Since society does not forbid the draft-
ing of unconscionable contracts, ab initio, neither should a professional
code.
This argument rests, however, on an incomplete view of the law of
fraud. Only those "frauds in the execution," which mischaracterize the
central purpose or existence of a contract, are void.' 99 Much more typical
are "frauds in the inducement," which involve all other misrepresentations
regarding the contract and which render the contract only voidable at the
option of the defrauded party. z° Unless the promulgators of the rules are
prepared to limit responsibility for fraud to a very narrow category of cases,
the void-voidable dichotomy does not support a refusal to adopt the pro-
posed rule.
Alternatively, it has been suggested that assisting a client is unethical
only if a client is engaged in conduct which violates criminal law or which
can be classified as an intentional tort.20  This view is inferred from the
limits imposed upon agents by the Restatement (Second) of Agency, section
348, which provides that an agent will be liable to a third party for know-
ingly assisting in actions involving tortious fraud or duress by the princi-
pal. 2  This argument seems to suggest that unless a lawyer is liable to a
third party, the Rules should not prohibit that behavior. However, liability
and ethical responsibility are not necessarily coextensive. In fact, both the
Model Code and the Model Rules specifically state that they are not in-
tended to serve as a basis for civil liability. 0 3
199. See, e.g., Operating Eng'r Pension Trust v. Gilliam, 737 F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1984)
(member induced to sign bargaining agreement and pension trust document where he thought he
signed only applications for union membership); Curtis v. Curtis, 56 N.M. 695, 248 P.2d 683
(1952) (wife signed separation and property division agreement because husband misrepresented
that it was merely for tax purposes); E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 235; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 comment c (1979).
200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1979). Rarely is the fraud so cen-
tral it is viewed as "going to the very character of the proposed contract itself." E.A. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 3, at 235. Voidable contracts, unlike void contracts, may be affirmed by the
person arguably harmed. Id. at 253-57.
201. See Hazard, supra note 79. It is unclear whether Professor Hazard was attempting to be
prescriptive or descriptive in his observations. It appears the former is true given his position that
the bar cannot do much more than proscribe fraud because no firm consensus exists regarding
moral values. He notes, however, that it is good and economically efficient to be trustworthy. Id.
at 183-84.
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348 (1958).
203. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preamble and preliminary statement (1980). The Code may be
relevant in a malpractice action. See, e.g., Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d
163 (1981); Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 487 N.E.2d 1377 (1986). There is some evidence
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In fact, the most analogous section to the proposed provision in the
Model Rules is Rule 3.1, which prohibits bringing or defending a frivolous
lawsuit. This rule does not require knowledge or intent,"° and many courts
have expressly rejected a cause of action on behalf of an opposing party
sounding in negligence.2a 5 Yet, an attorney may be disciplined for violating
Model Rule 3.1. No one advocates abolishing Model Rule 3.1. There is
simply no rational distinction which can be drawn between Rule 3.1 and the
proposed rule.
As the Preamble to the Model Rules makes clear, the disciplinary pro-
cess is not directly concerned with compensating individuals; rather, it
seeks to protect a general public interest in the integrity of the legal pro-
cess. 216 That integrity is undermined where a professional code of conduct
allows an attorney to pursue ends determined by legislatures to be im-
proper. Other than the tautology that fraudulent behavior is prohibited by
section 348 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, while unconscionable
behavior is not, there seems to be no reason to refrain from drafting a rule
more reflective of the judgment of the majority of citizens through their
legislatures. In fact, the growing number of cases finding attorneys liable to
third parties for negligent misrepresentation, which is not within the pur-
view of section 348, is consistent with the idea that responsibility should be
borne for improper behavior, regardless of whether it fits into the classic
definition of an intentional tort.20 7
VI. CONCLUSION
State legislatures have concluded that unconscionable contracts contra-
vene public policy, and that judicial machinery may not be employed to
enforce them. To enhance the likelihood that this collective decision will
have an impact on the lives of citizens who cannot protect themselves, law-
yers should not be allowed to draft them. Because a standard can be devised
with reference to the existing, positive law of unconscionability, a prohibi-
tion is not too vague and, in fact, redresses the current imbalance in the
ethics rules. This may encourage lawyers to refuse to offer such services.
Rather than simply referring to existing rules of ethics or current rules
of civil liability, "[r]elevant factors [in drafting an appropriate ethics rule]
that opposition to a rule like the proposed rule was motivated by fear of liability to third parties.
See Rhode, supra note 40, at 616 n.97.
204. See supra note 162.
205. See supra note 28-29.
206. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1983).
207. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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include not only the magnitude and likelihood of potential harm and the
attorney's capacity to affect it, but also the personal and social costs that
corrective action would impose. '2 8 It is clear that unconscionable con-
tracts cause harm. Yet, a rule prohibiting assistance in this context would
deprive clients only of rights to which they are not legally entitled; it there-
fore would not reduce their autonomy in any meaningful way. On balance,
there simply is no good reason to continue to allow lawyers to serve as
means to unconscionable ends.
208. Rhode, supra note 39, at 645. Although some may find this test too vague, it looks
remarkably like the Learned Hand balancing test, which lawyers seem capable of using. See supra
note 150.
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